Nicolò Generoso
Nicolò Generoso
Hi! I am an Economics PhD student at Yale.
I am interested in industrial organization and market design. I am on the 2026/27 job market.
I go by Nico.
You can reach me at nicolo.generoso@yale.edu

Working papers
Universal healthcare with a private option: Investment and congestion in diagnostic imaging Job Market Paper
We study patient welfare, capacity investment, and wait times in a universal healthcare system where patients can either wait for publicly funded care or pay for faster private treatment. Allowing private-pay care can stimulate capacity investment and relieve public queues, but market power can distort prices and the allocation of treatment. We build a model of patient choice, wait times, pricing, and capacity investment. Estimation combines administrative data on publicly funded care and scraped private prices and appointment availability. We find that patients have heterogeneous preferences for timely care. Moreover, pricing and capacity choices affect equilibrium wait times, but profit-maximizing providers do not internalize the resulting congestion externality. The socially efficient allocation would lower private prices and expand capacity. Disallowing private-pay care would reduce patient welfare through the loss of sorting on willingness to pay for timeliness, increased congestion in public queues, and reduced capacity investment. Attaining the status quo welfare under public-only provision would require a 35%-higher public budget to fund additional publicly provided capacity. Private-pay care benefits patients in nearly all urgency, age, and income groups, including those unlikely to use it themselves, who gain from reduced congestion in public queues.
Who gains from thicker markets? Access and market power in agricultural trade
We study how the organization of trade affects efficiency and surplus division in South Korea's agricultural wholesale markets, where farmers transport and sell produce through auction houses to buyers. Integrating fragmented trading pools can improve match quality and limit market power on both sides. However, it can also discourage participation and strengthen auction houses' fee-setting power. Consolidating trade in fewer locations can also raise transportation costs. We develop a model of farmer sorting, bidder participation, spot-market trade, downstream sales, and auction house fee setting. We use detailed fresh-produce auction records from 2016-2023 to estimate the model. On the seller side, we construct a panel of farmers' shipment choices under varying competitive environments shaped by exogenous harvest patterns, which identifies their sensitivity to distance and price. On the buyer side, optimal participation conditions identify bidder markdowns. We combine these markdowns with auction prices to identify match values created from trade as a flexible function of supply and bidder counts. Estimates show that match quality increases substantially with the number of participating bidders, especially for crops with more within-crop varieties. Yet neither side of the market fully internalizes these gains because of bidder market power and matching benefits that accrue to other participants; counterfactuals show that removing these distortions, as well as auction house market power, would raise total surplus by 27%. Nevertheless, we find that even with such distortions, integrating co-located auction houses---under the existing cap on auction house fees---would have a larger welfare effect (+40%), with farmers capturing roughly 41% of the increase. Finally, we show that consolidating niche market locations into regional hubs can raise total surplus despite higher transport costs.
Matching, competition, and auction design for differentiated goods
Allocation of differentiated goods to buyers with heterogeneous tastes introduces a tradeoff between efficient product-buyer matching and competition between buyers. Separate auctions improve matching by letting buyers target preferred items but thin competition, while pooling differentiated objects increases competition at the expense of match quality. We quantify this tradeoff in wholesale peach auctions in South Korea, where hundreds of lots are auctioned sequentially each day. We document bidder-variety sorting in auction participation and estimate a model of sequential auctions with multi-unit bidder demand, heterogeneous latent tastes for varieties, and selective entry. The estimates reveal heterogeneity in both relative valuations and willingness to bid across varieties. Revenue-maximizing schemes pool varieties that attract different bidders while preserving the horizontal differentiation most valuable for matching. These schemes would raise revenue by 4.8-7.5%, with effects on efficiency ranging from a 2.2% loss to a 0.5% gain. The status quo is typically dominated by pooling schemes that would improve both revenue and match value. Supply composition changes the balance between participation gains and matching losses, and an index of these forces closely predicts the resulting revenue ranking of pooling schemes.
Games with noisy signals about emotions
We formalize a novel framework allowing for the observation of noisy signals about co-players' emotions, or states of mind. Insofar as the latter are belief-dependent, such feedback allows players to draw inferences informing their strategic thinking. First, we give a definition of players' rationality: we require that rational players hold coherent beliefs, that they update their beliefs consistently with the evidence and according to Bayes rule, that they plan optimally, and that they implement their plans. Under mild and reasonable technical assumptions, we prove that the set of states of the world in which a player is rational is an event (a Borel set). Second, we analyze players' strategic reasoning adapting the strong rationalizability solution concept, and we give its epistemic justification in terms of players' rationality and interactive beliefs. The "forward-induction" reasoning entailed by such solution allows players to make inferences about their co-players' beliefs, private information, and future, or past and unobserved behavior based on the behavioral and emotional feedback they obtain as the game unfolds. We illustrate our framework with a signaling-like example, showing that the possibility of betraying lies, e.g., by blushing, may incentivize truth-telling.
Publications
Information flows and memory in games
The standard extensive-form partitional representation of information in sequential games fails to distinguish the description of the rules of interaction from the description of players' personal traits. Indeed, this representation does not model how the information given to players as per the rules of the game blends with players' cognitive abilities. We propose a representation of sequential games that explicitly describes the flow of information accruing to players rather than the stock of information retained by players encoded in information partitions. Then, we add a game-independent description of players' mnemonic abilities. If players have perfect memory, our flow representation gives rise to information partitions satisfying the perfect recall property, but different combinations of information flows and players' mnemonic abilities may induce the same information partitions. We show how to use our framework to explicitly model a wide array of cognitive limitations and embed them in the representation of game situations.
Teaching
- Microeconomic Theory (ECON 125)
- Economics of Uncertainty and Information (ECON 411)